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Plaintiff/Appellee Bradford Group West, Inc. ("Bradford")
hereby submits the following Brief of Plaintiff/Appellee.
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure
42.

This case was poured-over to the Utah Court of Appeals by

order of the Utah Supreme Court dated February 19, 1992.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Plaintiff accepts Appellants' statement of the standard
of review with respect to Appellants' challenge to the District
Court's order granting summary judgment to plaintiff. The standard
of review on appeal with respect to the trial court's decision
regarding whether to allow defendants additional time to conduct
discovery before ruling on plaintiff's Motion, however, is whether
the trial court abused its discretion.

See Sandy City v. Salt Lake

County, 794 P.2d 482, 488 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 1992 WL 14725 (Utah, Jan. 17, 1992), ("The trial
court has discretion to determine whether the reasons stated in a
Rule

56(f)

affidavit

are

adequate.");

Reeves

v.

Geiav

Pharmaceuticals. Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("It
is for the trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion,
to determine if the reasons stated in the Rule 56(f) affidavit are
adequate.")

Brad brf
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
No constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, rule,
or regulation necessarily is determinative of this appeal.
Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

appellate decision.

56

applies, however,

to

the

Utah

Court's

That rule provides in relevant part:

(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory judgment may, at any time after expiration
of 2 0 days from the commencement of the action or after
service of a motion for summary judgment by an adverse
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a
summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part
thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move
with or without supporting affidavits for a summary
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon.
. . . The
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of Case
In 1985, Bradford provided construction financing to an
entity known as SLC Limited IV ("SLC") for a project known as the
Center Pointe project.

SLC is a California limited partnership

whose general partner is Appellant Loran Corporation

Brad.brf
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("Loran").

Appellants James F. Kern ("Kern") and I. N. Fisher ("Fisher") are
officers of Loran.
Following the making of the initial construction loan,
the parties to this lawsuit and SLC made additional agreements
relating to that loan.

One of those agreements, which is more

fully described in the Statement of Facts set forth below, involved
the execution of a $100,000 promissory note (the "Note") by SLC in
favor of Bradford,

Loran, Fisher, and Kern guaranteed

SLC's

payment of the Note.1
After the Note matured and SLC failed to pay the Note,
Bradford initiated this action to collect the amounts owed pursuant
to Guarantors' written guarantees (the "Guarantees").
each have admitted
execution

and

execution

nonperformance

Guarantors

and non-payment of the Note and
of

the Guarantees.

contend, however, that by using the phrase "realty

Guarantors
investment

banker" on its stationary, Bradford improperly represented itself
as a "bank" in violation of Title 7 of the Utah Code, which governs
financial

institutions.

Guarantors claim that as a result of

Bradford's purported violation of Title 7, they are absolved of
their obligation with respect to the Note — which Guarantors claim
constitutes improper fees charged by Bradford in connection with
the construction loan. Guarantors also allege that Bradford failed
1

Defendants/Appellants Kern, Fisher, and Loran hereinafter
collectively are referred to as the "Guarantors."
Brad.brf
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to make disclosures in connection with the construction loan,
although that loan is not at issue in this case. Guarantors filed
a counterclaim against Bradford based on the same legal theories
that were raised in defense to Bradford's Complaint.
Course of Proceedings Below
Bradford commenced this action in January, 1991.

Some

two months after Bradford filed its Complaint, Guarantors filed an
Answer and Counterclaim.

Several days later, Guarantors served a

set of interrogatories and document requests on Bradford. Bradford
thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment (the "Motion"),
pursuant to which Bradford sought judgment in its favor against the
Guarantors and dismissal of the Guarantors' Counterclaim. Shortly
thereafter, Bradford

served upon Guarantors its responses to

Guarantors' discovery requests.
Unable to deny that they had executed and failed to
perform pursuant to their Guarantees, Guarantors argued that the
Guarantees should not be enforced because Bradford had not complied
with Title 7 of the Utah Code, and that Bradford had failed to make
certain disclosures relating to the earlier construction loan.
Guarantors also attempted to delay a ruling by Judge Lewis on
Bradford's

Motion

for

summary

judgment

additional time for discovery was needed.

by

contending

that

In response, Bradford

marshalled the uncontested facts, which established Bradford's
right to summary judgment and demonstrated that further discovery
-4Brad.brf

was not warranted or useful.

Briefing by the parties with respect

to Bradford's Motion was completed in April of 1991.
A hearing on Bradford's Motion was not conducted until
August 14, 199l.2

At the close of the hearing, during which Judge

Lewis heard oral argument from counsel for the respective parties,
Judge Lewis ruled that there were no genuine issues of material
fact and that Bradford was entitled to summary judgment as a matter
of law.

Guarantors' appeal is from that order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are supported by the record, are the

same facts that were relied on by Bradford
judgment

at

the

District

Court

level,

and

in seeking summary
were

accepted

undisputed by the Guarantors and by the District Court.3

as
[See

2

During the more than four months between completion of
briefing and the hearing on Bradford's Motion, Guarantors did not
conduct any further discovery.
3

The trial court found that the seventeen paragraphs upon
which plaintiff relied in seeking summary judgment and which are
set forth herein were "not denied by defendants, and are therefore
admitted, and no genuine issues of material fact exist." See Order
Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing
Defendant's [sic] Counterclaim , f 3 at p. 2 [R. 231].
During oral argument on the Motion, the following
exchange between the trial court and counsel for Guarantors
reflects the undisputed nature of the facts upon which Bradford
relied in seeking summary judgment:
THE COURT: Let me ask you one additional question.
Under the rules, I think it's quite clear, counsel, that
where you have not specifically admitted or denied the
facts set forth in the memo in support of motion for
Brad.brf
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Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's Motion
to Dismiss Counterclaim, Statement of Undisputed Material Facts,
11 1-17 (R. 44-50) ] /
1.

Bradford provided construction financing to SLC in

relation to a project known as the Center Pointe project.

The

construction loan was evidenced by a Trust Deed Note in the amount
of

$2,200,000.00,

dated

December

4,

1985, and

various

other

documents including Guarantors' Guaranties. In connection with the
construction loan, SLC executed a "Second Mortgage Endorsement to
Construction Loan Commitment", a copy of which is attached to the
Affidavit of J. Clawson, Sr. as Exhibit B, in which SLC and Fisher,
Kern, and Loran agreed to pay a $100,000 fee, payable on the
earlier of the sale or refinance of the Center Pointe project, or

summary judgment, that the court must deem them admitted.
Can I get you to respond to that?
MR. ANDERSON [Counsel for Guarantors]: You mean the
facts as they stated them?
THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. ANDERSON:
We don't dispute the facts, Your
Honor. We don't dispute the facts . . . .
Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment, August 14,
1991, at p. 21 [R. 254].
4

("R.

» refers to the record on appeal).
-6-

Brad.brf

the maturity of the construction loan.

[Affidavit of J. Clawson,

Sr. at % 14 (R. 65-66)].5
2.

In 1988, SLC refinanced the Center Pointe project

and obtained permanent financing from First Security Bank.

The

First Security permanent loan did not provide enough money to pay
the entire construction loan and fees owed to Bradford.
to allow the permanent

loan to be placed, Bradford

In order
agreed to

release its lien on the Center Pointe project and to accept from
SLC a note for the $100,000 shortfall.

That is the Note which is

the subject of the Guarantees involved in this lawsuit.

[Affidavit

of J. Clawson, Sr. at f 15 (R. 66) ]. 6
3.

SLC, for valuable consideration, made, executed, and

delivered the Note to Bradford on October 7, 1988.
Under

the

terms

of

the

Note,

SLC

$100,000.00 plus interest thereon.
4.

On

or

about

promised

[See R. 7-10].

to

pay

Bradford

[Answer at f 3 (R. 28)].

October

7,

1988,

for

valuable

consideration, Kern made, executed and delivered to Bradford his
Unconditional

Guaranty

(the

"Kern

Guarantee")

by

which

guaranteed payment of the Note owed by SLC to Bradford.

Kern

A copy of

5

For the Court's convenience, a copy of the Second Mortgage
Endorsement to the Construction Loan Commitment is set forth in the
Addendum hereto as Exhibit "E."
6

A copy of the Note is set forth in the Addendum hereto as
Exhibit "A."
Brad.brf
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the

Kern

Guarantee

is attached

On

Exhibit

"B" to

Bradford's

[See Answer at f 6 (R. 29)]. 7

Complaint (R. 11-12).
5.

as

or

about

October

7,

1988,

for

valuable

consideration, Fisher made, executed and delivered to Bradford his
Unconditional Guaranty

(the "Fisher Guarantee") by which Fisher

guaranteed payment of the Note owed by SLC to Bradford.
the Fisher Guarantee

is attached as Exhibit "C" to Bradford's
[See Answer at f 9 (R. 29)]. 8

Complaint (R. 13-14).
6.

On

consideration,
Bradford

or

Loran

A copy of

about

October

Corporation,

its Unconditional Guaranty

7,

1988,

executed

and

for

valuable

delivered

to

(the "Loran Guarantee") by

which Loran guaranteed payment of the Note owed by SLC to Bradford.
A copy

of the Loran Guarantee

is attached

Bradford's Complaint (R. 15-16).
7.
by

and

as Exhibit

"D" to

[See Answer at f 11 (R. 29)]. 9

On August 9, 1990, after the Note had matured, SLC,

through

its

general

partner,

Loran,

entered

into

an

Forbearance and Extension Agreement pursuant to which the maturity
date

of

the

Note

was

extended

to

December

31,

1990.

The

Forbearance and Extension Agreement was signed by Kern and Fisher
7

A copy of the Kern Guarantee is set forth in the Addendum
hereto as Exhibit "B."
8

A copy of the Fisher Guarantee is set forth in the Addendum
hereto as Exhibit "C."
9

A copy of the Loran Guarantee is set forth in the Addendum
hereto as Exhibit "D."
-8Brad.brf

as officers of Loran.

[Affidavit of J. Clawson, Sr. at % 11 (R.

65) . A copy of the Forbearance and Extension Agreement is attached
as Exhibit A (R. 68-71) to the Clawson Affidavit and is set forth
in the Addendum hereto as Exhibit " F " ] .
8.

The Forbearance and Extension Agreement states, in

paragraph 6, as follows:
Borrower hereby waives any defenses to payment or
performance or rights of setoff it may have as of the
date hereof relating to the Original Loan Documents.
[Affidavit of J. Clawson, Sr, at % 12.
9.

On

page

4

of

the

(R. 65)].

Forbearance

and

Extension

Agreement, Fisher and Kern, in their individual capacities as
guarantors of the Note, accepted and agreed to the terms of the
Forbearance and Extension Agreement.
Sr. at % 13.

[Affidavit of J. Clawson,

(R. 65)].

10.

The Note matured and became due and payable in full

by its terms.

SLC failed to pay the Note and therefore defaulted

on its covenants and obligations under the Note, despite demands
by Bradford that SLC pay the sums due and owing.

[Answer at f 4

(R. 28); Affidavit of J. Clawson, Sr. at f 3 (R. 62)].
11.

The amount due and owing on the Note from SLC to

Bradford is as follows:
accrued

unpaid

principal in the sum of $100,000.00 with

interest to and

including January

9,

1991, of

$1,434.45, all interest accruing thereafter on the unpaid principal
at the default rate of interest until all such principal is paid
-9Brad.brf

in full, together with late charges in the amount of $4,500.00.
Affidavit of J. Clawson, Sr. at % 4 (R. 62).]
12.

As a result of his execution of the Kern Guarantee,

and the obligation of SLC to Bradford, as described herein, Kern
became indebted to Bradford in the principal sum of $100,000.00
with accrued unpaid interest to and including January 9, 1991, of
$1,434.45, all interest accruing thereafter on the unpaid principal
at the default rate of interest provided in the Note until all such
principal is paid in full, together with late charges in the amount
of $4,500.00, together with Bradford's court costs and attorneys'
fees.

[Affidavit of J. Clawson, Sr. at f 6.
13.

(R 63)].

As a consequence of his execution of the Fisher

Guarantee, and the obligation of SLC to Bradford, Fisher became
indebted to Bradford
accrued

unpaid

in the principal sum of $100,000.00 with

interest to and

including January

9,

1991, of

$1,434.45, all interest accruing thereafter on the unpaid principal
at the default rate of interest provided in the Note until all such
principal is paid in full, together with late charges in the amount
of $4,500.00, together with Bradford's court costs and attorneys'
fees.

[Affidavit of J. Clawson, Sr. at f 8 (R. 63 and 64)].
14.

As a consequence of the execution of the Loran

Guarantee, and the obligation of SLC to Bradford, Loran Corporation
became indebted to Bradford in the principal sum of $100,000.00
with accrued unpaid interest to and including January 9, 1991, of
-10Brad brf

$1,434.45,

all

interest

accruing

thereafter

on

the

unpaid

principal, at the default rate of interest provided in the Note
until all such principal is paid in full, together with late
charges in the amount of $4,500,00, together with Bradford's court
costs and attorneys' fees.

[Affidavit of J. Clawson, Sr. at % 10

(R. 64)].
15.
business.

Bradford is engaged in the real estate services

On Bradford's stationery and business cards, Bradford

uses the words "realty investment banker".

Bradford is a member

of the Mortgage Banker's Association of America.

[Affidavit of J.

Clawson, Sr. at f 16 (R. 66)].
16.

Bradford does not accept from the public deposits

that are subject to withdrawal by check or similar instrument, nor
is it authorized to engage in the business of accepting depository
accounts.

[Affidavit of J. Clawson, Sr. at % 17 (R. 66)].
17.

Bradford is not subject to regulation by the Utah

Department of Financial Institutions. Bradford is not audited by,
does not file any reports or statements with, and is not required
to

be

licensed

by

or

file

reports

[Affidavit of J. Clawson Sr. at % 18.

with,

that

Department.

(R. 66)].

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the District Court's ruling and
dismiss Guarantors' appeal. This Court can do so without reaching
the merits of the appeal because Appellants have failed to cite in
-11Brad.brf

their Brief to this Court admissible and proper record support and
to marshall evidence in support of their claims as required by the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Even if this Court chooses to reach the merits of
Guarantors' appeal, this Court still should affirm Judge Lewis'
ruling for any of several independent reasons.

First, the trial

court properly ruled that the Financial Institutions Act (Utah Code
Ann. § 7-1-101 et seq.) as a matter of law does not govern the
transactions between Bradford and Guarantors.

Use of the terms

"mortgage banker" or "realty banker" does not violate the Financial
Institutions Act.

Second, even were Bradford subject to the

Financial Institutions Act and assuming Bradford did violate the
Financial Institutions Act, which Bradford did not, that would not
void the Guarantors' obligations to Bradford.

Third, even were

Bradford subject to the Financial Institutions Act and even had it
violated it, no private right of action exists that would permit
the Guarantors to enforce violations of the Financial Institutions
Act.

Fourth, Guarantors clearly and unequivocally waived in

writing any by their conduct claims or defenses arising prior to
the execution of the Note, which include the Counterclaim and
defense Guarantors asserted in the trial court.

They also are

estopped from asserting those defenses and Counterclaim.
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
connection with the Guarantors' Rule 56(f) request to conduct
-12Brad.brf

additional discovery prior to the trial court ruling on Bradford's
Motion. Guarantors had sufficient time to conduct discovery.

Some

seven months passed after Bradford filed its Motion until Judge
Lewis

ruled

on

the Motion.

Over

four months went

by

after

Guarantors requested additional time to conduct discovery until the
District

Court

conducted

the hearing

and

ruled

on

Bradford's

Motion. During that period, and despite Guarantors' purported need
for

additional

discovery,

Guarantors

attempted to conduct any discovery.

neither

conducted

nor

Perhaps equally as important

as their failure to conduct discovery, despite ample time to do so,
is the fact that, in light of the legal nature of the matters at
issue, additional discovery of the nature Guarantors desired to
conduct as described in the Rule 56(f) affidavit of their counsel
was unnecessary and irrelevant to the merits of Bradford's Motion.
ARGUMENT
I.

THI8 COURT MEED NOT REACH THE MERITS OF GUARANTORS1 APPEAL
BECAUSE GUARANTORS HAVE NOT SUPPORTED THE FACTS SET FORTH IN
THEIR BRIEF WITH PROPER CITATIONS TO THE RECORD AS REQUIRED
BY THIS COURT»S RULES.
On pages 8 through 11 of Appellants' Brief —

paragraphs

1 through 9, Guarantors purport to set forth facts relevant to the
issues before this Court.

Those facts, however, are not supported

by admissible evidence in the record and may not be considered.
Paragraphs

1

through

6

of

the

Guarantors'

statement

are

a

restatement of the facts stated in their memorandum in opposition
-13Brad.brf

to Bradford's motion for summary judgment filed in the district
court.

[See R. 88-91].

Those statements, both at the lower court

level and on appeal, are unsupported by any affidavit or other
evidence in the record. Judge Lewis of the District Court properly
ruled that those statements did not constitute a denial of the
undisputed facts relied on by Bradford.

[See Transcript of Hearing

on Motion for Summary Judgment, August 14, 1991, at p. 21 (R. 254);
id. at R. 254]. Paragraph 7 similarly is not supported by record
citation.
There also is no record support for Guarantors' erroneous
assertion set forth in paragraph 9 of Guarantors' Statement of
Facts that ''Plaintiff/Respondent admits that it used the word
"bank" and "banker" on its stationary and business cards." Rather,
Bradford acknowledged using the words "realty investment banker"
in its business.

[See R. 49]. Guarantors' citation to page 56 of

the record apparently is in error inasmuch as that page provides
no support for Guarantors' factual assertion.
In Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court stated as follows:
We need not reach the merits of this dispute for several
reasons. First, [appellant] has not supported the facts
set forth in his brief with citations to the record as
required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(6)
(Supp. 1986).
In State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 757
(Utah 1982), we interpreted Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
75 (p) (2) (2) (d) , the forerunner of Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24(a)(6), and stated:

Brad brf
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This Court will assume the correctness of the
judgment below if counsel on appeal does not
comply
with
the
requirements
of
Rule
75 (p) (2) (2) (d) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
as to making a concise statement of facts and
citation of the pages in the record where they
are supported.
Trees, 738 P.2d at 612-13.
In Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d
551 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) , this Court observed:
In order to challenge a trial court's findings of fact,
a party "must marshall the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence,
the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as
to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus
making them clearly erroneous.'" In re Bartell, 776 P.2d
885, 886 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added) (quoting State v.
Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). See also, e.g. .
Scharf v. BMG Corp. . 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985);
Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988), Appellants often overlook or disregard this
heavy burden. When the duty to marshall is not properly
discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of
challenges to the findings and accept the findings as
valid." (Citations omitted).
Mountain States Broadcasting Co., 783 P. 2d at 553 (emphasis added).
Utah

Rule

of Appellate

Procedure

24(a)(7)

presently

provides that "[all] statements of fact and references to the
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record."
Rule 24(a)(9) states that the appellant's "argument shall contain
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the
issues presented, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and
parts of the record relied on."

Appellants' Brief not only is

inadequate with respect to citations to the record, it also fails
Brad.brf

-15-

to marshall relevant, admissible evidence in support of Guarantors'
arguments.
Because
applicable
consider

rules
the

Guarantors
of

merits

this
of

have

failed

Court, this
this

appeal

to

Court
and

comply
should

should

with

the

refuse

to

assume

the

correctness of Judge Lewis' Order granting summary judgment to
Bradford and dismissing Guarantors' Counterclaim.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
GUARANTORS* RULE 56(f) REQUEST.
Judge Lewis of the District Court did not abuse her

discretion when she ruled on Bradford's Motion without delaying to
allow Guarantors more time to conduct additional discovery.

In

response to Bradford's Motion, Guarantors submitted the Affidavit
of Gary

Anderson

wherein Mr. Anderson

stated

that

additional

discovery was needed concerning the relationship between Bradford
and the Guarantors, the relationship of Bradford to other lending
institutions from which Bradford may have obtained money, and the
representations, if any, made by Bradford concerning its "banking
status."

See Affidavit of Gary J. Anderson [R. 147-150].

None of

these requested discovery matters are relevant to the disposition
of Bradford's Motion.

Brad.brf
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conducted discovery on those issues

and had ample time to conduct

additional discovery had they so chosen.
A,

Rule 56(f) Determinations are
Discretion of the Trial Court.

Left

to

the

Sound

To delay a summary judgment ruling in order to conduct
discovery, a party must make an appropriate showing demonstrating
a need and right to such discovery.

Such a showing normally

requires that party seeking the delay file a Rule 56(f) affidavit
setting

forth reasons

for the delay.

See Reeves v. Geigy

Pharmaceutical. Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), rev'd in
part on other grounds, 1992 WL 14725 (Utah, Jan. 17, 1992); Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). The trial court then must determine
whether the reasons stated in the affidavit are adequate, whether
additional discovery might make any difference to the Court's
decision on the pending summary judgment motion, or whether the
movant is simply delaying or on a "fishing expedition."

This

determination is left to the sound discretion of the trial court
and should not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.
See Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482, 488 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) ("The trial court has discretion to determine whether
the reasons stated in a Rule 56(f) affidavit are adequate.");
Reeves, 764 P.2d at 639 ("It

is for the trial court, in the

10

See Bradford's Answers to Interrogatories and its Response
to Request for Production of Documents set forth in the Addendum
to Appellants' Brief.
Brad.brf
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exercise of its sound discretion, to determine if the reasons
stated in the Rule 56(f) affidavit are adequate.'').
B.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion.
Judge Lewis of the District Court did not abuse her

discretion when she ruled on Bradford's Motion for Summary Judgment
without

allowing

further

delay

for

additional

discovery

by

Guarantors.
1.

Guarantors had adequate time to conduct discovery.

Guarantors had adequate time to conduct discovery and in
fact had conducted discovery on the issues stated in the Rule 56(f)
affidavit. Guarantors filed their Answer and Counterclaim in this
case on February

27, 1991.

[R. 28-34].

Four days later,

Guarantors initiated discovery by serving their First Set of
Interrogatories and their Request for Production of Documents. [R.
35].

In their Interrogatories, Guarantors requested information

concerning the original construction loan made by Bradford to SLC,
Bradford's corporate structure, Bradford's filings and approvals
with government agencies, Bradford's use of the word "bank," and
the SLC

loan history.

Documents,

Guarantors

In their Request
requested

production

for Production of
of

all

documents

relating to the original construction loan and all documents
relating to "monies [Bradford] obtained to finance said loan from
Dime Bank, any other banks including banks specifically located in

Brad.brf
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Idaho,"11

On March 19, 1991, Bradford responded to these requests

by answering the interrogatories and agreeing to produce nonprivileged documents at any mutually convenient time and place.
[See R.

84-87; Addendum

to Appellants' Brief.]

Thereafter,

Guarantors conducted no further inquiry.12
Bradford filed its Motion on March 22, 1991. [R. 42-43].
The Motion had been fully briefed and was submitted for decision
on April 23, 1991. [R. 176-78].13

The court initially set the

motions for hearing on July 12, 1991, [R. 189], which would have
allowed Guarantors approximately three additional months to conduct
discovery.

Subsequently, at the Guarantors' request, the hearing

was continued another month, until August 14, 1991.

[R. 195].

Some seven months passed between the date Bradford filed
its Complaint and the date of the hearing on Bradford's Motion.

11

See Addendum to Appellants' Brief.

12

Guarantors' assertion at the bottom of page 15 of
Appellants' Brief regarding the purported inadequacy of Bradford's
discovery responses is unfounded.
If Guarantors believed that
Bradford's discovery responses somehow were deficient, they should
have notified Bradford of such belief and
requested that the
purported deficiencies be corrected. Or Guarantors should have
filed a motion seeking to compel "proper" responses. Guarantors
did neither.
13

Bradford also filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavits of I.
N. Fisher and Gary J. Anderson and to Strike Defendants' Statement
of Undisputed Material Facts. [See R. 169-175].
An Amended Notice to Submit for Decision was filed with the
trial court on April 25, 1991. [R. 179-181].
Brad.brf
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Four months passed between the date Guarantors submitted a Rule
56(f) Affidavit seeking time for additional discovery and the date
of the hearing.

During those time periods, Guarantors had the

opportunity to review Bradford's documents and pursue any other
discovery that they desired.

They failed to do so. Accordingly,

Judge Lewis acted well within her sound discretion when she ruled
on Bradford's Motion in August, 1991 without delaying further her
decision on the Motion.
2.

Guarantors failed to demonstrate the
relevancy of any additional discovery.

need

or

In addition to having adequate time to conduct discovery,
thus making unnecessary a grant of additional time for Guarantors
to conduct discovery, Guarantors

failed

to show a need for

additional discovery. The undisputed facts in this case make clear
that Bradford

is not a financial

institution subject to the

provisions of the Financial Institutions Act.u

Even if Bradford

were subject to the Financial Institutions Act and somehow violated
it, which Bradford is not and did not, as set forth below there is
no legal basis for a finding that such violation would absolve
Guarantors of their obligations to Bradford pursuant to their

14

Indeed, paragraph 17 of Bradford's Statement of Undisputed
Facts of its memorandum filed in the trial court in support of
Bradford's Motion stated that "Bradford is not subject to
regulation by the Utah State Department of Financial Institutions."
[R. 50]. As previously noted, Guarantors did not controvert any
of the facts upon which Bradford based its Motion.
Brad brf
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Guarantees. Additionally, Guarantors expressly waived any defenses
and claims arising prior to August 9, 1990.

Guarantors' purported

desire to conduct discovery regarding events transpiring prior to
that date is irrelevant.

Because Guarantors failed to demonstrate

a need for the additional discovery, Judge Lewis properly chose not
to further delay a ruling on Bradford's Motion.15
15

Guarantors complain that the trial court failed to make
appropriate findings on the discovery issue.
This argument is
curious in light of the fact that, although given the opportunity
to do so, counsel for Guarantors failed to present Guarantors'
56(f) argument during oral argument before the trial court. FSee
R. 234-266].
Guarantors do not assert that the trial court's failure
to make findings regarding the discovery issue constitutes error.
They imply that it may, however, by stating that "This Court and
the Court of Appeals have ruled in a long line of cases that a case
will be reversed or remanded where findings were inadequate to
support the conclusions," [Appellants' Brief at 16-17], and by
citing three cases: Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623 (Utah 1987);
Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986) ; and Marchant v. Marchant,
743 P.2d 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Each of those cases involved
child custody determinations, which require written findings of
fact and conclusions of law by the trial court, that bear no
relevance to the 56(f) issue in this case.
The District Court adequately set forth in its Order
Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing
Defendant's [sic] Counterclaim" the basis for its ruling. [See R.
230-31].
Judge Lewis found that the facts upon which Bradford
relied in seeking summary judgment had been admitted by Guarantors,
that Bradford is not a bank or financial institution, and that,
even if Bradford were a bank or financial institution, it had not
violated the Utah Financial Institutions Act. [R. 221]. By ruling
that summary judgment was proper, the trial court necessarily ruled
that additional discovery was not necessary and/or appropriate.
Even if the District Court had failed to make any
statement regarding the reasons for its grant of summary judgment,
such failure would not have been improper. In Neerinas v. Utah
Brad.brf
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OP SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSAL
OF GUARANTORS' COUNTERCLAIM WAS PROPER.
The
Complaint

basis

for

as well as

improperly

held

Guarantors'

defenses

for their Counterclaim

itself

out

as

a

"bank"

to

is that

facts

Guarantors'

before

baseless

it,

Judge

defenses

and

Bradford

in violation

provisions of Utah's Financial Institutions Act.
undisputed

Bradford's

Lewis

the

Based on the

properly

Counterclaim

of

and

rejected
correctly

granted summary judgment as requested by Bradford.
A.

The Financial Institutions Act Does Not Govern the
Transactions Between Bradford and Guarantors.
Guarantors' reliance on the Financial Institutions Act

as the basis for its defenses and Counterclaim in the District
Court is misplaced.
1.

Bradford
is not
Institutions Act.

governed

by

the

Financial

The Financial Institutions Act does not apply to Bradford
because Bradford is not a "financial institution" as defined by the
Financial

Institutions

Act.

The

Act

gives

the

Utah

State

Department of Financial Institutions responsibility for executing
all

laws relating to financial

subject to Title 7.

institutions and other persons

See Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-201.

The Financial

State Bar, 817 FT27r320, 323 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court
observed that "[w]hile it may be instructive for the trial court
to inform the litigants of the legal basis for its decision, we are
not persuaded that failure to do so constitutes reversible error."
-22Brad.brf

Institutions

Act

defines

a

"financial

institution"

as

"any

institution subject to the jurisdiction of the department because
of this title".

Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-103(13).

subject to jurisdiction

An "institution

of the department" is defined

as any

institution described in Article 5 of the Act (which lists banks,
savings and loans, and similar entities) "except to the extent
those institutions or persons are engaged solely in making or
soliciting loans to residents of this state or loans secured by
real property

located

in this state."

Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-

103(21).
The Financial Institutions Act is designed to regulate
deposit-taking activities, not loan making.

For example, under the

Act, all "banks" are subject to the jurisdiction, supervision, and
examination of the Department of Financial Institutions.
Code Ann.

§ 7-1-501.

A "bank" is defined

as an

See Utah

institution

authorized by law "to accept deposits from the public".

Utah Code

Ann. § 7-1-103(1) and § 7-3-3(1) (a).
It is undisputed

that Bradford

is not authorized to

accept from the public deposits that are subject to withdrawal by
check or similar instrument.
undisputed

that

Bradford

[See R. 49 at % 16]. It likewise is

is not authorized

business of accepting depository accounts.

to

engage

[Id.]

in the

Judge Lewis

properly concluded based on the undisputed facts before her that
the Financial Institutions Act does not apply to Bradford and thus
-23Brad brf

summary

judgment was appropriate with respect to Guarantors'

defenses and Counterclaim.
Under a definition of financial institution similar to
that found in the Financial Institutions Act, the federal district
court in Texas held that a mortgage company in the business of
originating and servicing mortgage loans and selling interests in
mortgage loan pools was not a "state bank", because it did not have
the power to accept deposits.

See In re Central Mortgage & Trust

Co. . 50 B.R. 1010 (D. Tex. 1985).16
The banking statutes relied upon by Guarantors regulate
deposit-taking activities and are not applicable to Bradford's
business or to the transactions that are the subject of this
lawsuit.

Judge

Lewis properly

made

this

determination

and

correctly granted summary judgment to Bradford. This Court should
affirm Judge Lewis' decision.
2.

Use of the term "realty investment banker" does not
violate the Financial Institutions Act.

There is no dispute that Bradford has used the term
"realty investment banker" in identifying itself to the public.
16

Similarly, a mortgage company which does not accept deposits
does not fall within the federal definition of a bank. Flintridge
Station Assocs. v. American Fletcher Mortgage Co., 761 F.2d 434
(7th Cir. 1985) ; see also In re Republic Financial Corp.. 77 B.R.
282, 285 (N.D. Okla. 1987) (an entity without the power to receive
general deposits is not a bank) and First Bancorporation v. Board
of Governors of Fed. Reserve System, 728 F.2d 434, 436 (10th Cir.
1984) ("bank" is an institution that accepts deposits that the
depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand).
Brad.brf
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Use of this term, however, which is synonymous with the term
''mortgage banker," does not violate the Financial Institutions Act.
Indeed, the terms "investment banker" and "mortgage banker" are
common

in the commercial world

and have commonly understood

meanings completely apart from the traditional use of the word
"bank" that is proscribed in the Financial Institutions Act. Those
terms do not imply any deposit-taking function, which is the
activity regulated by the Act.

Black's Law Dictionary, 5th

Edition, provides the following definitions:
Bank. A bank is an institution, usually incorporated,
whose business it is to receive money on deposit, cash
checks or drafts, discount commercial paper, make loans,
and issue promissory notes payable to bearer, known as
bank notes.
Mortgage banker.
A person or firm engaged in the
business of dealing in mortgages including their
placement and refinancing. Normally such banker uses its
own funds as opposed to a commercial or savings and loan
bank which uses primarily funds of depositors. While
some mortgage bankers do provide long term (permanent)
financing, the majority specialize in short term and
interim financing.
Investment banker. An underwriter, the middleman between
the corporation issuing new securities and the public.
The usual practice is for one or more investment banks
to buy outright from a corporation a new issue of stocks
or bonds.
The group forms a syndicate to sell the
securities to individuals and to sell the securities to
individuals and institutions. Investment bankers also
distribute very large blocks of stocks or bonds-perhaps
held by an estate. Thereafter the market in the security
may be over-the-counter or on a stock exchange.
In arguing that Bradford's use of the phrase "mortgage
banker" or "realty investment banker" is a violation of the
Brad.brf
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Financial

Institutions Act, Guarantors ignore the common sense

application and intent of the Act.

The Financial Institutions Act

allows such use of the word "bank," where use of the word is not
likely to cause confusion:
Notwithstanding any other restriction in this section,
the prohibition of the use of specific names and words
in subsections (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) does not apply
if the effect of the use of the name or word would not
likely lead any person to reasonably believe that a
person or his place of business is a financial
institution, or is conducting a business subject to the
jurisdiction of the department.
Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-701(8)(a) (emphasis added). 17
There is no evidence, or even assertion, in this case to
the effect that Guarantors ever believed or reasonably could have
believed

that

Bradford

met

the

statutory

requirements

"business subject to the jurisdiction of the department" —

of

a

i.e.,

that Bradford was taking deposits, could accept deposits, or wanted
to be a depositary institution for Guarantors.

Bradford never has

operated as a "bank" or held itself out as a "bank" for purposes
of the Financial Institutions Act. Guarantors admitted this in the

17

For this reason, use of terms such as "blood bank", "food
bank," "realty investment banker," and other such usage of the word
"bank" obviously does not subject the user to the provisions of the
Financial Institutions Act.
Brad.brf
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trial court.

[See paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Statement of Facts

set forth above] .18
3.

Even if Bradford were in violation of the Financial
Institutions Act, that would not void Guarantors'
obligations.

There is no legal basis for a finding that a violation
of the Utah Financial Institutions Act by Bradford would absolve
Guarantors of their clear obligations under their Guarantees.
a.

The basis for Guarantors1 defenses and
Counterclaim previously has been addressed and
rejected.

The theory

raised by the Guarantors —

i.e., that

violation of an act such as Utah's Financial Institutions Act
absolves an obligor of some or all of his obligations — previously
has been addressed and rejected.

For example, in Shepherd v.

Finance Assocs. of Auburn, 316 N.E.2d

597

(Mass. 1974), the

borrower argued that notes and mortgages made by the borrower were
void because the lender was conducting a "banking business" in
violation of state law. The court rejected this argument and ruled
that any violation of state law was irrelevant to the borrower's
liability:
18

Those facts establish that Bradford does not accept from the
public deposits which are subject to withdrawal by check or similar
instrument, nor is it authorized to engage in the business of
accepting depository accounts.
Bradford is not subject to
regulation by the Utah State Department of Financial Institutions.
Bradford is not audited by that Department, does not file any
reports or statements with that Department, and is not required to
be licensed by or file reports with that Department.
Brad.brf
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Even so, the plaintiff is afforded no basis for relief.
Chapter 167 [the State Banking law] affords a specific
remedy for its violation, beginning with an examination
by the Commissioner of Banks and culminating in possible
fines, assessment of expenses and injunctive orders . .
No mention is made of any effect on the public
transactions entered into by an offending corporation.
We are unwilling to assume that the legislature intended
to effect such a forfeiture of private contractual
rights.
Id. at 601.
The same conclusion properly is drawn from the Utah
statutes. The Financial Institutions Act makes no mention that any
violation of its provisions voids the private obligations of note
makers and guarantors.

Rather, the statute gives exclusive and

extensive enforcement powers to the Commissioner of the Utah
Department of Financial Institutions. The Commissioner is allowed
to

inspect

corporations,

to

take

possession

of

financial

institutions, to issue cease and desist orders, and to collect the
debts owed to seized institutions.
seq.

See Utah Code Ann. § 7-2-1 et

The Guarantors may not avoid their private, contractual

obligations by alleging that Bradford may be subject to some future
enforcement action brought by the Utah Department of Financial
Institutions.19
19

Utah Courts have on various occasions reiterated that
parties are free to make their own contracts and that courts will
not make a better contract for a party than what the parties have
agreed. See, e.g., Ted R. Brown & Assocs. v. Carnes Corp., 753
P. 2d 964, 970 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (Court cannot make better
contract for a party than what parties have agreed to); Rio Alaom
Corp. v. Jimco Ltd.. 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980).
Brad.brf
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In Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah
1983), the Utah Supreme Court observed that "with few exceptions,
it is still axiomatic in contract law that 'persons dealing at
arm's length are entitled to contract on their own terms without
the interference of the courts for the purpose of relieving one
side or the other

from the effects of a bad

bargain'".

As

expressly admitted by Guarantors, the parties in this case agreed
to

certain

interest

construction loan.
Facts].

rates

and

fees

in

connection

with

the

[See Paragraph 1 of Bradford's Statement of

Later, when the construction loan was refinanced, $100,000

of the loan remained unpaid.

Plaintiff agreed to accept the Note

and the Guarantees for the remaining balance. The agreement to pay
interest and fees was valid at the time it was made, and the
subsequent execution of the Note and Guarantees reaffirmed the
validity.

[See Statement of Facts set forth above, Paragraphs 2-

14].
b.

The cases Guarantors cite do not support
Guarantors1 defenses or Counterclaim.

In support of their argument that a violation of the
Financial

Institutions

Act

voids

the

Note

owed

to

Bradford,

In Utah, any private party can contract to lend money,
and in doing so, the parties can agree to any interest rates and
fees. The general usury laws in Utah were repealed in 1969 (see
former U.C.A. § 7-1-2 and § 7-l-2a). In commercial transactions,
parties may agree on any interest in exchange for a loan of money.
See Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1.
Brad.brf
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Guarantors cite to three older decisions from New York.

One of

these cases involved a usurious promissory note that was held void.
See Koven v. Cline. 280N.Y.S. 814 (N.Y. App. 1935).

The other two

cases involved the exercise of banking powers in violation of the
New York banking statute.

In each case, the contract that was

voided had arisen directly out of an illegal act.

Those decisions

rely on an express provision in the New York statute that declared
such instruments void.
328,

330

See Voluntary Ass'n v. Goodman, 244 N.Y.S.

(N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1930).

The Utah statute contains no

similar provision, and in fact implies just the opposite by giving
power

to

the

commissioner

to

seize

and

collect

assets

institutions (such as notes payable to the institution).

of

See Utah

Code Ann. § 7-2-1 et seq.
In Dinkenspeel v. Q'Dav, 47 Utah 18, 151 P. 344 (1915),
the plaintiff leased a building from O'Day
operating

an

illegal

gambling

house.

for the purpose of

When

O'Day

was

facing

foreclosure, the plaintiff loaned money to O'Day to preserve the
gambling operation.
property.

The loan was secured by a mortgage on the

O'Day subsequently defaulted on the loan owed to the

plaintiff, and the plaintiff sued to enforce the note and foreclose
the mortgage.

O'Day argued that the note was void because it was

made for the purpose of furthering the illegal gambling activities.
In enforcing the note, the Utah Supreme Court explained:

-30Brad.brf

As already pointed out, there was nothing illegal or
immoral in lending the money, or in executing the note
evidencing the loan, or in giving the mortgage to secure
it. What the defendant complains of lies back of that
transaction and has no necessary connection with it.
Id. at 346.
In this case, the Note and Guarantees are not illegal in
any sense, nor is there any allegation that would make them or any
aspect of any of the transactions relevant to this case illegal.
The lending of money, with interest and fees to be charged, is a
lawful act by any person or entity.

Guarantors may not avoid their

valid obligations by alleging a violation of a state statute that
does not regulate this transaction and that, even if it did, would
not void it.
B.

No Private Right of Action
Financial Institutions Act,

Exists

to

Enforce

the

Even if Bradford's use of the term "realty investment
banker" in its correspondence were a violation of the Financial
Institutions Act, that violation would not provide a defense to
payment of Guarantors' obligations.

Enforcement of the Financial

Institutions Act is the exclusive responsibility of the Department
of Financial Institutions.
1-321.

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-1-201 and 7-

Guarantors' defenses and Counterclaim, which erroneously

presuppose that an

implied private right of action exists to

enforce the Act, therefore must fail as a matter of law.

Brad.brf
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Indeed,

Guarantors cite no case implying a private right of action under
Utah's Financial Institutions Act or under any similar act.
Under Utah law, a private right of action is not implied
from a violation of a state statute that does not clearly provide
for such private right of action.20 Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court
has observed

in this regard that courts should refrain from

fashioning such a remedy. Rather, "it is a matter best left to the
legislature."

Milliner v. Elmer Fox and Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah

1974) (decided after Cort v. Ash). See Shepard v. Finance Assocs.
of Auburn. 316 N.E.2d 597, 601 (Mass. 1974) ("We are unwilling to
assume that the legislature intended to effect . . . a forfeiture
of private contractual rights" as a result of a violation of state
banking laws.)21
20

Guarantors' implied private right of action analysis fails,
among other reasons, because it deals with implied private rights
of action under federal statutes and fails to address implied
rights of action under Utah law.
21

Even applying the Cort v. Ash analysis that Guarantors
advance, Guarantors cannot establish that a private right of action
for violation of the Financial Institutions Act should be implied.
Guarantors contend that the first prong of the Cort v.
Ash analysis (i.e., that the plaintiff is "one of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted — that is, does
the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?") is
satisfied because the public is the primary party for whose benefit
the statute was passed and Guarantors are members of the public.
Appellants7 Brief at 29. This broad brush analysis is flawed. The
clear purpose of the Financial Institutions Act is to protect
depositors of state regulated banks. Guarantors are not a member
of that class. Furthermore, under Guarantors' overly simplistic
approach, a private cause of action would be implied under all
Brad.brf
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Even if Guarantors were able to show that a private right
of

action

did

exist

under

the

Financial

Institutions

Act,

Guarantors' claims still would fail because they have alleged no
damage arising out of or caused by Bradford's use of the term
public laws — at least with respect to the first prong of the
analysis. Such is not the case. Even if the general public were
the class for whose especial benefit the Financial Institutions Act
was intended, the fact that the Act exists to protect the general
public — and not specified classes, would weigh heavily in favor
of not implying individual rights of action under the statute.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Ash noted specifically that the
question is whether the statute creates a federal right in favor
of the plaintiff. The state law at issue in this case clearly does
not imply a federal right.
The second prong — whether there is any indication of
legislative intent to create or deny such a remedy — makes clear
that a private right of action should not be implied under the
Financial Institutions Act. Indeed, Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-102(1)(a)
expressly provides that "It is the purpose of this title to expand
and strengthen the duties, powers and responsibilities of the
Department of Financial Institutions and to place under its
jurisdiction all classes of institutions and other businesses
engaged in furnishing financial services to the people of this
state, . . . ." (Emphasis added).
The final prong of the analysis ("is the cause of action
one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the
concern of the states so that it would be inappropriate to infer
a cause of action based solely on federal law?) likewise
demonstrates that a private cause of action should not be implied
under the Financial Institutions Act. This prong demonstrates the
impropriety of attempting to apply the Cort v. Ash analysis to the
state law at issue. The Financial Institutions Act is not only
relegated to state law, it is state law and the concern of the
State.
Thus, even were this Court to apply the Cort v. Ash
analysis to the Financial Institutions Act in determining whether
a private right of action under the Act should be implied, that
analysis makes clear that a private right of action should not be
implied under the Act.
Brad.brf
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"bank".

Guarantors' only allegations concerning damage are that

Guarantors have paid interest, costs, and fees under the loan
documents•

As shown above, interest, costs, and fees can be

charged by any private party, according to contract, and do not
constitute recoverable damages to which Guarantors are entitled.
C.

Guarantors Have Waived Any Defenses and Claims Arising
Prior to the Execution of the Note.^
The undisputed evidence in the District Court makes clear

that Guarantors have waived their defenses to Bradford's Complaint
as well as any right to assert their Counterclaim.
1.

Guarantors
defenses.

Guarantors

expressly

waived

in

waived

writing

their
their

claims

and

defenses

and

Counterclaim that were asserted in the District Court.

After

entering into the construction loan commitment pertaining to the
Center Pointe protect in 1985, Guarantors in 1988 executed a
document entitled "Second Mortgage Endorsement to Construction Loan
Commitment," which modified

the terms and conditions of the

22

Although the District Court did not specifically address
Bradford's waiver argument in its ruling granting summary judgment
and dismissing Guarantors7 Counterclaim, this Court properly may
do so. See, e.g., Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892,
895 (Utah 1988) (Appellate court "may affirm trial court's
decisions on any proper ground(s), despite the trial court's having
assigned another reason for its ruling."); Baashaw v. Baashaw, 788
P.2d 1057, 1060 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("[T]his court may affirm 'if
the trial court's decision can be sustained on any proper legal
basis.'" (quoting Taylor v. Estate of Tavlor, 770 P.2d 163, 169
(Utah Ct. App. 1989)).
Brad brf

-34-

construction

loan commitment,

[See Guarantor's Memorandum

of

Points and Authorities in Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment and to Dismiss Counterclaim f 2, at 2 (R. 89) and
Exhibit

B

thereto

(R.

118-119)].

In

that

Second

Mortgage

Endorsement to Construction Loan Commitment, Guarantors agreed to
pay a "'$100,000 additional fee' . . • due and payable upon the
sale of the property in question, the refinancing of the loan, or
at loan maturity as extended, whichever comes first,"23

Guarantors

have admitted that the $100,000 loan fee was drawn against the loan
proceeds

on

or

about

November

28,

1986,

[id.],

and

have

acknowledged that the proceeds of their loan from First Security
Bank ($2,100,000) were insufficient to pay the $2,200,000 principal
balance of the loan from Bradford and that Guarantors therefore
executed

in

favor

of

Bradford

the

Note,

a

trust

deed,

the

Guarantees, and a security agreement in favor of Bradford for the
amount of the shortfall —
[See

Guarantors'

$100,000 —

"Memorandum

of

together with interest.

Points

and

Authorities

in

Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and to
Dismiss Counterclaim" %% 5-6, at p.3 (R. 90) and Exhibits E and F
to that memorandum (R. 122-126; R. 127-140)].

23

See Guarantors' memorandum filed in opposition to Bradford's
Motion at K 2 (R. 89) and Exhibit B to that memorandum (R. 118119); see also Exhibit "F" of the Addendum to this Brief].
Brad.brf
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After the Note matured

in 1990, SLC entered

into an

Forbearance and Extension Agreement pursuant to which the maturity
date

of

the

Note

was

extended

to

December

31,

1990.

The

Forbearance and Extension Agreement was signed by Kern and Fisher
as officers of Loran and was accepted and agreed to by Kern and
Fisher as Guarantors of the Note.

[See Forbearance and Extension

Agreement (R. 65, f 13; R. 68-71), a copy of which is set forth in
the Addendum hereto as Exhibit " F " ] .
Agreement

contained

an

The Forbearance and Extension

express waiver

to

claims

and

defenses

relating to Bradford's enforcement of the Note and Guarantees:
Borrower hereby waives any defenses to payment or
performance or rights of setoff it may have as of the
date hereof relating to the original loan documents.
[See Affidavit of J. Clawson, Sr. at % 12 (R. 65) ; see also R. 6871].
It is undisputed that Guarantors' defenses to enforcement
of

the Note

and

Counterclaim,
Forbearance

Guarantees, as well

arose
and

prior

Extension

to

the

time

as the basis
that

Agreement.

It

the

for their

executed

also

cannot

the
be

legitimately disputed that Guarantors knew of those claims and
defenses

when

they

signed

the

agreement.

Because

Guarantors

expressly waived any and all defenses they otherwise might have
had, the District Court's decision in granting summary judgment and
dismissing Guarantors' Counterclaim was correct. This Court should
affirm that decision and dismiss Guarantors' appeal.
-36Brad.brf

2.

Guarantors1 conduct resulted in a waiver of their
defenses and Counterclaim.

In addition to waiving claims and defenses in writing,
Guarantors waived their claims and defenses by their conduct.
Waiver results when a party, with knowledge of an existing claim,
relinquishes that claim by actions or conduct.

See B.R. Woodward

Marketing, Inc. v. Collins Food Serv., Inc., 754 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah
App. 1988).
In Woodward, this Court affirmed a summary judgment
ruling that a party had waived its right to certain commissions
when the party failed to demand the commissions during the term of
its employment.

Woodward's principal testified:

"I felt that

asking for more money, or . . . even questioning the commission
situation, might jeopardize my standing in the company and cause
them to want to cancel my contract. So I just kind of rolled over
and played dead."

Id. at 103.

This Court refused to accept Woodward's argument that it
never intended to waive its commissions, finding that Woodward's
actions constituted a waiver of its right to seek the commissions
Woodward claimed it was owed:
We agree that Woodward, by its conduct, waived its
right to incentive commissions under the Sales Agreement
with Collins.
The evidence is uncontroverted that
Woodward was aware of the existence of its right to
receive compensation . . . and that it knew such a claim
had to be documented by a daily sales report and
submitted monthly.
Nonetheless, Woodward decided to
"roll over and play dead" as it was "more than willing
-37Brad.brf

to settle for $45,000 a year." It was not until after
the relationship was terminated that Woodward sought what
it knew it was entitled to receive during the entire
course of its employment. Such conduct, notwithstanding
whatever
unexpressed
subjective
intent
Woodward's
principal had, unequivocally evidenced an intent to waive
its right to claim the incentive commissions.
Id. at 103-04.
The

Woodward

decision

is

consistent

with

the

Idaho

Supreme Court case of First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. Gaige,
155 Idaho 172, 765 P.2d 683 (1988).

In Gaige, First Security Bank

of Idaho extended a series of loans to a company called A.J. Gaige
Associates.

The loans were secured by the guarantee of Mr. Gaige

and by other collateral.
decided

to

liquidate

After several unprofitable years, Gaige

the

company.

In

connection

with

the

liquidation, Gaige, the company, and First Security entered into
a "loan workout agreement" in July of 1984 in which First Security
allowed Gaige a four-month period to liquidate the company.

Absent

the agreement, First Security immediately could have sought to
foreclose on its collateral.
When the liquidation failed to satisfy the debt, First
Security brought action against Gaige on the guaranty.
responded with defenses and a counterclaim

Gaige

alleging breach of

contract, fraud, negligence, breach of duty, and rescission.

The

trial court granted summary judgment in favor of First Security and
the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed.
by

expressly

ratifying

his

Id. at 686. The court held that

guaranty
-38-
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in

connection

with

the

subsequent loan modification, Gaige waived any claim based on
fraudulent inducement.

Id.

Similarly, Guarantors in this case waived any right to
assert claims and/or defenses arising in connection with the
construction loan.

The undisputed facts in this case show that

Guarantors caused Bradford to release the construction loan and
security in return for the Note and Guarantees. Later, Guarantors
obtained an extension of the maturity of the Note and Guarantees,
thereby again affirming the validity of the Guarantees. Under such
circumstances, the law is clear that Guarantors have waived any
right to assert the Counterclaim and defenses Guarantors asserted
in the District Court.24 See Leavitt v. Blohm, 11 Utah 2d 220, 357
P.2d 190, 194 (1960) (right of rescission lost where party made no
claim for return of money until filing of her counterclaim);
McKeller Real Estate & Investment Co., et al. v. Paxton, 62 Utah
97, 218 P. 128, 132 (1923) (waiver found where defendants treated
the

contract

as

in

force

until

Guarantors

have

the

institution

of

legal

proceedings).
Because

waived

their

defenses

and

Counterclaim, Judge Lewis' grant of Bradford's motion for summary

24

Although the question of waiver is generally one of fact,
"it is perhaps more accurate to view the ultimate conclusion
whether waiver has occurred, given particular facts, as a question
of law." Woodward, 754 P.2d at 101.
Brad.brf
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judgment, including dismissal

of Guarantors' Counterclaim, was

proper and should be affirmed by this Court.25
CONCLUSION
Judge Lewis properly granted summary judgment in favor
of Bradford and correctly dismissed Guarantors' Counterclaim.

This

Court should affirm that ruling.

25

Guarantors' Counterclaim and defenses also are barred by the
doctrine of estoppel.
In Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor
Control Commission, 602 P. 2d 689 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme
Court set forth the following elements necessary to establish an
estoppel:
(1) an admission, statement or act [or silence]
inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted,
(2) action by the other party on the faith of such
admission, statement or act [or silence], and
(3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing
the first party to contradict or repudiate such
admission, statement or act [or silence].
Id. at 694. The same facts that establish waiver also establish
estoppel.
As previously discussed, despite knowledge of the
Counterclaim and defenses they now assert, Guarantors represented
the validity of the Note and Guarantees at issue. Bradford granted
extensions of time and took other action in reliance on Guarantors'
acknowledgements and in reliance on Guarantors' failure to assert
their claims. Having relied on Guarantors' statements, acts, and
silence, injury to Bradford would result were Guarantors now
allowed to contradict or repudiate their representations and
unequivocal conduct.
Brad brf
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DATED this Q A A day of April, 1992.
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE

S c o t t F. Young .JEsq.
Mark F. J a m e s / ^ l s q .
185 South Stacfce S t r e e t ,

Salt Lake City, Utah
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-41-

S u i t e 1300

84111

CERTIFICATE OF 8ERVICE
I hereby certify that on the Qjc\ci

day of April, 1992,

I mailed by U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid, four (4) true
and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLEE'S BRIEF to the
following:
Gary J. Anderson, Esq.
Westpark
750 North Freedom Blvd., Suite 102
Provo, Utah 84601

* CLvvltCX
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRADFORD GROUP WEST, INC.,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 920104-CA

vs.
JAMES F. KERN, I.N. FISHER, and
LORAN CORPORATION, a California
corporation,

Priority No. 16

Defendants/Appellants.
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, GRANTING
PLAINTIFF'S/APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
District Court Civil No. 910900291 CV
HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS, DISTRICT JUDGE
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PROMISSORY NOTE
Loan Number:
$100,000.00

October 7, 1988
Salt Lake City, Utah

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, in installments and at the time hereinafter stated, SLC LIMITED IV, a California Limited Partnership
("Maker") promises to pay to the order of the BRADFORD GROUP
WEST, INC., a Utah Corporation, its successors and assigns
("Holder"), at Salt Lake City, Utah, or at such other place as
the Holder hereof may from time to time designate in writing,
in lawful money of the United States of America, the principal
sum of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) with interest
on the unpaid principal balance from time to time outstanding
as follows:
a)
From the date hereof the rate of interest per
annum shall equal at all times a variable rate which at all
times is two and one-half percent (2Vi%) above the then quoted
base interest rate for loans charged and published by The Idaho
First National Bank (The "Base Rate"), calculated and applied
on the basis of a 365-day year, increases or decreases in such
Base Rate being effective concurrently with the effective date
of each such change. Any changes in the principal interest
rate under this Note are effective without prior notice.
For credit to be allowed on the day funds are received,
such collected funds must be received by the Holder on or
before 2:00 p.m. that same day. Interest shall be due and
payable on the first (1st) day of each month throughout the
term of this Note or any extension hereof, with the first such
payment due on November 1, 1988. If not previously paid, the
entire principal balance of this Note, plus all accrued and
unpaid interest, shall be due and payable in full on or before
October 7, 1989.
Unless otherwise provided herein, this Note may be prepaid
in whole or in part at any time without penalty.
All payments shall be applied under this Note as follows
and in the order indicated, at the option of Holder: (1) to
the repayment of sums advanced by Holder below to protect the
property which secures this Note or any Guaranty of this Note,
together with interest thereon at the default rate specified
below; (2) to the payment of the Holder's attorneys fees and
other expenses as provided herein; (3) to interest due; and (4)
to the reduction of principal.
-iEXHIBIT A

twv.^c^'j

If default be made in the payment of any sums due under
this Note, or in any other term or condition hereof, or in any
Trust Deed, Security Agreement, Guaranty, or any other agreement between Maker (or its Guarantors) and Holder pertaining to
the indebtedness evidenced hereby, then, upon fifteen (15)
days* written notice of such default from Holder and/or upon
thirty (30) days' written notice of any non-monetary default,
default interest shall accrue, at the option of Holder, at five
percent (5%) per annum over the Base Rate, calculated and
applied on the basis of a three hundred and sixty-five (365)
day year, increases or decreases in such base rate being
concurrent with the effective date of each such change.
Further, if default be made in the payment of any sums due
under this Note, or in any other term or condition hereof or in
any Trust Deed, Security Agreement, Guaranty, or any other
agreements between Maker (or its Guarantors) and Holder pertaining to the indebtedness herein, then, upon written notice
of default from Holder to Maker and Maker's failure to cure
monetary defaults within fifteen (15) days and/or non-monetary
defaults within thirty (30) days, at the option of Holder,
Holder shall cause all of the unpaid principal of this Note,
with interest accrued thereon, to become immediately due and
payable. Unpaid accrued interest shall accumulate and be added
to the then outstanding principal balance on the fifth day of
each month during default.
In the event that any payment hereunder shall not be made
within fifteen (15) days after the due date, a late charge of
five cents ($.05) for each dollar ($1.00) so overdue may be
charged by Holder for the purpose of defraying the expense incident to handling such delinquent payments. Such late charge
represents the reasonable estimate of Holder and Maker of a
fair average compensation for the loss that may be sustained by
Holder due to the failure of Maker to make timely payments.
Such late charge shall be paid without prejudice to the right
of Holder to collect any other amounts provided to be paid or
to declare a default hereunder or under the Trust Deed referred
to below or any other agreement securing or guaranteeing this
Note.
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein
or in any other agreement pertaining to the indebtedness evidenced hereby, the total liability for payments in the nature
of interest, additional interest and other charges shall not
exceed the applicable limits imposed by the interest rate laws
of the State of Utah. If any payments in the nature of interest, additional interest and other charges made hereunder or
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under any other agreement pertaining to the indebtedness
evidenced hereby, are held to be in excess, they shall be
considered payment of principal hereunder and the indebtedness
evidenced hereby shall be reduced by such amount so that the
total liability for payments in the nature of interest, additional interest and other charges shall not exceed the applicable limits imposed by the interest rate laws of the State of
Utah in compliance with the desires of Maker and Holder.
In the event suit be brought hereon, or an attorney be
employed or expenses be incurred to compel payment of this Note
or any portion of the indebtedness evidenced hereby, Maker
promises to pay all such expenses and attorneys' fees, including fees on appeal.
The Maker, endorsers and guarantors of this Note, and each
of them, hereby waive all homestead and/or exemption rights,
diligence, presentment, protest and demand, notice of protest
and demand, notice, notice of dishonor and/or non-payment and
specifically consent to and waive notice of (1) any renewals or
extensions of this Note, whether made to or in favor of Maker
or any other person or persons, (2) release of all or any part
of the security for the payment hereof, or (3) release of any
party directly or indirectly liable for this obligation.
The terms of this Note apply to, inure to the benefit of,
and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees,
administrators, executors, successors and permitted assigns.
This Note is secured, without limitation, by a certain
Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents of even date herewith (the
•'Trust Deed"), encumbering certain real property (the "Property") located in Salt Lake County, Utah. If the Trustor
therein shall sell, convey, or alienate the Property, or any
part thereof, or any interest therein, or shall be divested of
its title or any interest therein in any manner or way, or
should the composition of Trustor be substantially altered,
either voluntarily or involuntarily, without the prior written
consent of Holder, which consent shall not be unreasonably
withheld. Holder may at its option, without notice, require the
entire principal balance of this Note, with accrued interest
and all other sums, to be immediately due and payable.
This Note is guaranteed by the Unconditional Guaranties of
Loran Corporation, I. N. Fisher and James F. Kern.
This Note shall be governed by and construed in accordance
with the laws of the State of Utah.
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If this Note is signed by more than one Maker, the
obligations of Maker hereunder shall be joint and several.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Maker has executed this Note as of the
date first written above.
MAKER:
SLC LIMITED IV, a California
Limited Partnership
By:

Loran Corporation, its
general partner

By
I. N. Fisher, President

By
James F. Kern, Vice President
SCMBDP321
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UNCONDITIONAL GUARANTY
The undersigned, James F. Kern ("Guarantor11), herob'/
unconditionally guarantees to the Bradford Grcun West, Inc.,
its successors and assigns ("Holder"), the full* ccnx-iete and
prompt payment and performance of all obligations cf~SLC
Limited IV, a California limited partnership ("Maker"), under
that certain Promissory Note in the original principal amount
of $
, dated October
, 1988 (the "Note"), The
Guarantor acknowledges and agrees that he is jointly and
severally liable for the full amounts owing under the Note.
From default and until such time as the obligations of
Maker and ssiy guarantors under the Note and any guaranties are
paid or satisfied in full, Holder may recover the amounts cved
on the Note from the Maker and/or guarantors and/or the
collateral. No action or inaction by the Holder to collect
from one party or the collateral or any portion therecr shall
be deemed" a waiver of any right to proceed against any ether
party or collateral.
Guarantor waives any rights to an apportionment of
liability, fault, or damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-37 to 43 (1987, as amended), and any ether rights to
apportionment of liability, fault, or damages pursuant to ether
statutes, in ecruity, or at common law, it being expressly
agreed that the liability and obligation of Guarantor under
this Guaranty and any other documents executed in connection
herewith, shall be joint and several with the Maker and any
other guarantors. It is expressly agreed that Holder may, in
its sole discretion, waive, release,"modify, forego or forbear
from exercising any or all rights it may have against the Maker
or any guarantor pursuant to the terms of the Note, any
guaranty, security agreement, trust deed or other document
executed in connection with the note.
Guarantor further agrees that this Guaranty shall be
interpreted in accordance with the lavs of Utah, and expressly
consents to jurisdiction and venue of any suit hereon in the
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah.
Guarantor agrees and acknowledges that Utah Code Ann.
§ 73-37-1 to -9 - (1953), does not apply to any action hereon or
liability created hereby, and that Holcer may sue Guarantor
hereunder and seek to collect from Guarantor personally without
looking first, or at ail, to any collateral or trust deed
securinc the note or any guaranty thereof.

EXHIBIT B

This Guaranty is secured by Trust Deed with Assignment of
Rents, dated October
, 1988, executed by Newport Investment
Associates, a general partnership whose sole general partners
are James F. Kern and I. N, Fisher, as Trustor, in favor of
Nevada Title Company, as Trustee, and The Bradford Group West,
Inc., as Beneficiary, relating to certain real property located
in Clark County, Nevada (the "Collateral").
Guarantor represents and warrants that the Collateral is
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances except as follows:

Guarantor further represents and warrants that Newport
Investment Associates has good and merchantable title to the
Collateral and all necessary authority and right to pledge said
Collateral to Holder.
DATED this *?&

day of October, 1988.

c r vi T - .

f

"-.y*"l2

TabC

UNCONDITIONAL GUARANTY
The undersigned, I . N. Fisher ("Guarantor")
hereby
u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y guarantees t o the Bradford Gr<«gp#est, I n c . ,
i t s s u c c e s s o r s and a s s i g n s ("Holder"), the f u l l , complete # n d
prompt payment and performance of a l l ob l i gat fens ~o& -SIX^
Limited IV, a C a l i f o r n i a l i m i t e d partnership Iffiajser^Q ,-tflafler
t h a t c e r t a i n Promissory Note in the o r i g i n a l Stj^ri^mJ
amount
of $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , dated October 7, 1988 ( t h e " N f e / ' ) .-CJThe
undersigned acknowledges and agrees t h a t he i j ^ & o l n t l y arf&
s e v e r a l l y l i a b l e for t h e f u l l amounts owing un3er the U o t e ,
From d e f a u l t and u n t i l such time as the oSllfcfatl
Maker and any guarantors under the Note and an;
11 Jill I iff! ill i
paid or satisfied in full, Holder may recover"
atfnints^fcved
on the Note from the Maker and/or guarantors
/orjfee q^Jateral. No action or inaction by the Holder to
lletfyfrdpone
party or the collateral or any portion thereo
a waiver of any right to proceed against any
collateral.
Guarantor waives any rights to an apporti
t'"1J|JLiJ^ility, fault, or damages pursuant to Utah Code
S 7f-27-39 to
43 (1987, as amended), and any other rights t
>po r tionmeni *trf
liability, fault, or damages pursuant to otfte
fctutJMf, ifi
equity, or at common law, it being expressly
f e e d t h a t ^the
liability and obligation of Guarantor under this ^uar^anty and
any other documents executed in connection fee "*" ;h, -sSall be
joint and several with the Maker and any othe
arantqj^s.
It
is expressly agreed that Holder may, in its^s
iscretion,
waive, release, modify, forego or forbear from f: r c i s i j i g any
or all rights it may have against the Maker "or
guarantor
pursuant to the terms of the Note, any guaran
ecjkijty
agreement, trust deed or other document execu
*n # n a e c t i on
with the Note.
Guarantor further agrees that this Guaran
interpreted in accordance with the laws of Ut
consents to jurisdiction and venue of any sui
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah.
Guarantor agrees and acknowledges that Ut
§ 78-37-1 to -9 (1953), does not apply to ahy
liability created hereby, and that Holder ^ay
hereunder and seek to collect from Guarantor
looking first, or at all, to any collateral o
securing the note or any guaranty thereof.

ShaHJbe
an<t£xp

rec .an

This Guaranty is secured by Trust Deed with Assignment of
Rents, dated October 7, 1988, executed by Newport Investment
Associates, a general partnership whose sole general partners
are James F. Kern and I. N. Fisher, as Trustor, in favor of
Nevada Title Company, as Trustee, and the Bradford Group West,
Inc., as Beneficiary, relating to certain real property located
in Clark County, Nevada (the "Collateral").
Guarantor represents and warrants that the Collateral is
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances except as follows:
(1) First Trust Deed in the original principal amount of
$1,850,000 to County Savings Bank of Santa Barbara; and (2)
Second Trust Deed in the original principal amount of $300,000
to Jerry King.
Guarantor further represents and warrants that Newport
Investment Associates has good and merchantable title to the
Collateral and all necessary authority and right to pledge said
Collateral to Holder.
DATED this *?&/

day of October, 1988.

N. Fisher
SCMBDP320
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UNCONDITIONAL GUARANTY
The undersigned, Loran Corporation ("Guarantor"), hereby
unconditionally guarantees to the Bradford Group West, Inc.,
its successors and assigns ("Holder"), the full, complete and
prompt payment and performance of all obligations of SLC
Limited IV, a California limited partnership ("Maker"), under
that certain Promissory Note in the original principal amount
of $100,000.00, dated October 7, 1988 (the "Note"). Guarantor
acknowledges and agrees that it is jointly and severally liable
for the full amounts owing under the Note.
From default and until such time as the obligations of Maker
and any guarantors under the Note and any guaranties are paid or
satisfied in full, Holder may recover the amounts owed on the
Note from the Maker and/or guarantors and/or the collateral. No
action or inaction by the Holder to collect from one party or
the collateral or any portion thereof shall be deemed a waiver
of any right to proceed against any other party or collateral.
Guarantor waives any rights to an apportionment of liability, fault, or damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 to
43 (1987, as amended), and any other rights to apportionment of
liability, fault, or damages pursuant to other statutes, in
equity, or at common law, it being expressly agreed that the
liability and obligation of Guarantor under this Guaranty and
any other documents executed in connection herewith, shall be
joint and several with the Maker and any other guarantors. It
is expressly agreed that Holder may, in its sole discretion,
waive, release, modify, forego or forbear from exercising any
or all rights it may have against the Maker or any guarantor
pursuant to the terms of the Note, any guaranty, security agreement, trust deed or other document executed in connection with
the Note.
Guarantor further agrees that this Guaranty shall be interpreted in accordance with the laws of Utah, and expressly
consents to jurisdiction and venue of any suit hereon in the
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah.
Guarantor agrees and acknowledges that Utah Code Ann.
S 78-37-1 to -9 (1953), does not apply to any action hereon or
liability created hereby, and that Holder may sue Guarantor
hereunder and seek to collect from Guarantor personally without
looking first, or at all, to any collateral or trust deed securing the note or any guaranty thereof.
r

EXHIBIT D
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This Guaranty is secured by Security Agreement dated
October 7, 1988, wherein the collateral is all of Loran
Corporation's partnership interest in Las Vegas Investment
Associates and Las Vegas Investment Associates II, both limited
partnerships, and all accounts receivable and contract rights
relating thereto or owing to Guarantor by Las Vegas Investment
Associates and/or Las Vegas Investment Associates II, and all
proceeds thereof (the "Collateral").
Guarantor represents and warrants that the above-described
Collateral is free and clear of any liens and encumbrances and
that Guarantor owns a 20% general partnership interest in both
Las Vegas Investment Associates and Las Vegas Investment
Associates II, subject to the terms of the limited partnership
agreements thereof.
Guarantor further represents and warrants that it has good
and merchantable title to the Collateral and all necessary
authority and right to pledge said Collateral to Holder.
DATED this 1h*f

day of October, 1988.

LORAN CORPORATION

By

J

^

^

SCMBDP318

-2-

f. y;ri6

TabE

jO)

4°

SECOND MORTGAGE ENDORSEMENT
TO CONSTRUCTION LOAN COMMITMENT

SLC Limited IV
RE:

Construction Loan Commitment #85.17C

Gentlemen:
This endorsement modifies the terms and conditions of the above
referenced commitment as set forth below:
1) Loan Amount
$2,200,000
TBGW shall have the right to structure the loan into a
single loan or, at its sole option, to divide the loan
into a First and Second Mortgage/Trust Deed in amounts to
be determined solely by TBGW.
2) Revised Fee Schedule
Commitment
Loan
Contingent

$ 22,000
22,000
100,000

Total Fees

$144,000

NOTE: $10,500 of the commitment fee is payable upon
acceptance of this commitment and is non-refundable except
in the event that certain conditions required by this
commitment are considered by TBGW to be beyond the
Borrower's control. The loan fee shall be payable on/or
before closing of the construction loan. The balance
of the commitment fee and the loan fee shall be paid at
closing of the construction loan. The contingent fee
shall be due and payable upon the sale of the property,
refinancing of the loan, or at the loan maturity as may be
extended, whichever comes first.

3) WmAing
Second Mortgage shall be advanced on a last-in basis,
it is the proceeds from the First Mortgage shall be
fully funded prior to the funding of the Second Mortgage.
4)

Security
Evidence of indebtedness shall be secured by a First
Mortgage/Trust Deed and at the sole option of TBGW, a

EXHIBIT E

Second Mortgage Endorsement
Page 2

Second Mortgage/Trust Deed in the amounts to be determined
by TBGW on the fee simple absolute title to the real
property and the improvements thereto, subject only to
encumbrances that shall be acceptable to TBGW and free of
materialmen's liens or special assessments for work
completed or under construction as of the date of closing.
5) Other Conditions and Terms
All conditions of the commitment and of the required
security documents shall apply equally to both loans as if
incorporated therein. However, the Second Mortgage shall
be subordinate to the First Mortgage loan.
These changes constitute the only changes in the
commitment and all other terms and conditions remain
unchanged.
Sincerely,

The undersigned accept the terms and conditions of this
loan commitment:
SLC LIMITED IV

Loraa Corporation

0
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FORBEARANCE AND EXTENSION AGREEMENT

This Forbearance and Extension Agreement is made by and
between The Bradford Group West, Inc., a Utah Corporation
("Lender") and SLC Limited IV, a California limited partnership
("Borrower") this

/ J ^ day of August 1990.

WHEREAS, Lender loaned to the Borrowers $100,000.00
evidenced by a Promissory Note dated October 17 # 1988 and secured
by certain Deeds of Trust, Security Agreements and Assignments of
Rent of even date therewith, and guaranteed by I.N. Fisher and
James F. Kern, all of the above documents hereinafter referred to
as the Original Loan Documents.
WHEREAS, the Note matured October 7, 1989, Borrower seeks
Lender's forbearance from exercising its rights under the default
provisions of the Original Loan Documents and desires to extend
the note to December 31, 1990 upon the terms and conditions set
forth below.
NOW, THEREFORE, it is agreed as follows:
1.

The Borrower agrees to pay principal payments based on

the following schedule:
August 1, 1990

$15,000,000 Plus Interest

SepteJ^jpr 1, 1990

15,000,000 Plus Interest

Octob**ti# 1990

15,000,000 Plus Interest

November 1, 1990

15,000,000 Plus Interest

December 1, 1990

15,000,000 Plus Interest

1
EXHIBIT F

Any remaining principal plus accrued interest shall be paid in
full on or before December 31, 1990.
2.

Borrower shall (i) at signing pay any delinquent

interest and (ii) pay interest in full on or before the 1st day
of each month' at the rate of interest per annum equal at all
times to a variable rate which at all times is two and one-half
percent (2 1/2%) above the then quoted base interest rate for
loans charged and published by West One Bank (The "Base Rate"),
calculated and applied on the basis of a 365-day year, increases
or decreases in such Base Rate being effective concurrently with
the effective date of each such change.

Any changes in the

principal interest rate under the Note are effective without
prior notice.

Failure to pay principal and interest on or before

the first day of each month shall subject Borrower to late fees
and penalties as provided in the Note.

Failure to pay interest

on or before the 30th day of each month, shall immediately
terminate this Agreement and the Note shall become immediately
due and payable and all default rates, fees and penalties shall
apply.
3.

In addition the parties agree as follows:

Borrower upon signing this agreement shall pay $644.52 late
fee, interest due and all attorneys fees regarding this
extension.

2
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4.

By entering into this Forbearance and Extension

Agreement, Lender shall no way be considered to have waived any
and all rights or remedies under the original loan documents by
reason of the default existing at the time of this Agreement.
Lender shall have full right to exercise all of said rights and
remedies under the Original Loan Documents immediately upon the
breach of any provision of this Forbearance and Extension
Agreement.
5.

Borrower hereby warrants and agrees that to the date

hereof, Lender is not in breach of any of the terms and
conditions of the Original Loan Documents.
6.

Borrower hereby waives any defenses to payment or

performance or rights to setoff it may have as of the date hereof
relating to the Original Loan Documents.

"Lender"
The Bradford Group West, Inc.

SLC Limited IV, a California
Limited Partnership with Loran
Corporation, a California
corporation as itsy^eneral partner

ITS. Fisher, President
By
L>»
James F.\Kern, Vice President

000^70

Accepted and agreed t o t h i s

Q ^ c l a y of August 1990

Guarantors

I.N* F i s h e r , Guarantor

i\
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